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NOTE
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES, IN SOME
LARGE BUSINESSES, IN SOME MAJOR CITIES, SOMETIMES . . .
Eric Allen Harris*
“[P]eople need not be limited by physical handicaps as long as they are not
disabled in spirit.”
~Stephen Hawking1
INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was signed
into law by President George H.W. Bush.   Congress stated that the purpose2
of the ADA was “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”   The3
first subchapter (Title I) of the ADA addresses accommodations for the
disabled in the field of employment.  President Bush attempted to quash “fears
that the ADA is too vague or too costly” by stating that the Act struck a
careful balance between the rights of individuals with disabilities and the
legitimate interests of businesses.   In particular, he noted that Title I of the4
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5. Id.
6. § 12101(b)(1).
7. Id. § 12101(a)(1).
8. Id. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(3).
ADA would become effective for employers with twenty-five or more
employees on July 26, 1992, with an extension to employers with fifteen or
more employees on July 26, 1994, thus permitting employers adequate time
to become acquainted with the ADA.   But in fact, the exclusion of employers5
with fewer than fifteen employees requires only a small percentage of the
nation’s employers to ever become acquainted with the ADA at all.
This Note argues that the balance discussed by President Bush is in fact
tipped toward the employer and not the individual with a disability.  The
bright-line exclusion of all employers with fewer than fifteen employees is a
major roadblock to achieving the “comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” that
Congress stated as the clear purpose of the ADA.6
First, this Note will outline the current ADA statute and the legislative
debate that brought it and the minimum employee threshold into existence.
Next, the way in which the courts are currently analyzing the ADA and the
minimum-employee threshold will be discussed.  Then, an empirical study of
the current state of employment and disability will be presented.  This study
will show that while the ADA has improved the ability of a disabled person
to procure employment, the inclusion of a minimum-employee threshold has
left a substantial gap of non-coverage.  Finally, this Note will propose two
changes to the ADA that address this problem.  The first, and definitively
bolder, alternative suggests removing the minimum-employee threshold
completely and allowing the judiciary to use the undue-hardship provision of
the ADA to balance the needs and abilities of both parties.  The second
alternative preserves a bright-line test for ease of judicial administration and
employer understanding, but it is based on each individual employer in order
to facilitate the goals that the minimum-employee threshold was designed to
achieve.
I.  THE ADA: A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL MANDATE
In 1990, Congress found that forty-three million Americans had a
disability and that the number was increasing.   Congress further found that7
persons with disabilities were isolated and discriminated against in critical
areas such as employment and access to public accommodations.   These8
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detriments were causing disabled persons as a group to occupy an inferior
status in the social, economic, and educational aspects of our society.9
Congress stated that the nation’s proper goal was to place persons with
disabilities on an even playing field with the rest of society.   Thus, invoking10
the sweep of congressional authority, Congress adopted the ADA to eliminate
discrimination against persons with disabilities.11
However, immediately following this promising introduction, Congress
distinguished between the types of discrimination suffered by persons with
disabilities and addressed them with different degrees of protection.  Congress
addressed access to “any place of public accommodation” in the third
subchapter (Title III) of the ADA.   A public accommodation was defined in12
Title III as any private entity that affects commerce and that falls within a
statutorily defined non-exhaustive list of entity types.   Meanwhile, Congress13
limited equal opportunity to employment for persons with disabilities to all
“covered entit[ies]” in Title I of the ADA.   After July 26, 1994, a covered14
entity included employers that retain fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year.   These two titles are supposed to eliminate discrimination15
against persons with disabilities.  However, Title III is a “clear and
comprehensive mandate”  that includes any entity affecting commerce.  Title16
I, on the other hand, is not comprehensive as it addresses discrimination in
only part of the labor force.  This discrepancy is not consistent with the goal
of the ADA.
The fifteen-employee minimum threshold was borrowed from the 1972
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which addresses
employment discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, and religion.17
The threshold in Title VII was chosen so that small businesses would be
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protected and spared compliance and litigation expenses.   The courts have18
inferred that the reason for the ADA’s minimum-employee threshold is the
same as Title VII because both statutes address employment discrimination.19
But another reason for the Title VII threshold that surfaced during the
congressional debates was the concern of forcing small family-run businesses
to hire outside of their family or ethnicity.   The concern is that a small20
business owner of a particular religion may have conflicts with a member of
another religion.  This, however, should not have been a concern for the
drafters of the ADA because disability and creed are different bases of
discrimination.  One’s worship habits may actually offend an owner of a small
business to the point that she does not want to associate with the person.
However, someone’s mobility impediment is not offensive in a manner such
that a business owner should not want to associate with the person.  The sole
reason for adopting the minimum-employee threshold in the ADA should have
been to protect small business owners from incurring the expense of litigation
and compliance, not personal belief.
Another reason for the inclusion of the minimum-employee threshold is
that Congress wanted to provide some protection for small businesses.   The21
use of such a bright-line test—either fifteen employees or not—improves
judicial efficiency.  The court can provide the protection desired by Congress
but yet not have to expend large amounts of time applying a more laborious
test.  Yet even though bright-line rules are often desirable, they cannot be used
when they are unreasonable in light of human experience and common sense.22
The fifteen-employee minimum threshold, although easy to apply, cannot be
supported if it defies common sense—as will be shown later in this Note.
II.  INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
Like many statutes, the ADA has morphed over time due to judicial
interpretation.  The minimum-employee threshold of the ADA has
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unfortunately been substantially restricted by the courts.  This section will
first show that some courts have interpreted the ADA to have a much stronger
link to Title VII than the legislature intended, thereby frustrating the purpose
of the statute; and second, that these courts have thus applied a test to the
threshold requirement that substantially limits the amount of “covered
entities.”
An important concern in the minimum-employee threshold question is
what is an employer?  The statute states that an employer is “a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees.”   A23
“person” would include a corporation because it possesses the legal authority
to act as a person under the law.   But is a corporation comprised of a parent24
company and all of its subsidiaries, or is each subsidiary its own company?
In the former, all of the employees of the linked businesses would be counted
toward the minimum-employee threshold.  In the latter, each would stand
alone in the count toward the minimum-employee threshold.  The courts have
developed different tests in answering this question.
Under Title VII, some courts of appeals have adopted the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) test to determine if two nominally distinct
companies should be considered a single entity and thus have their employee
numbers consolidated.   The test encompasses four factors: “interrelation of25
operations, common management, centralized control of labor relations, and
common ownership or financial control.”   Courts adopting this test have26
focused on the factor of centralized control of labor relations or the location
of employment decisions.   The Department of Labor has advocated the27
NLRB four factor test to determine the number of employees in the parent-
subsidiary context in Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) cases, which are
limited to employers with fifty or more employees.   Oftentimes, cases are28
brought and similarly analyzed under both the FMLA and ADA statutes.29
At least two courts of appeals, however, have stated that the National
Labor Relations Act, administered by the NLRB, and Title VII have different
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policies and thus should not be governed by the same test.   In the ADA30
context, these courts have reasoned that the minimum-employee threshold
should be strictly construed because the legislative purpose behind the
threshold is to spare small companies the considerable expense of complying
with the ADA’s many nuanced requirements.   These courts have adopted the31
reasoning of Judge Richard Posner in the Seventh Circuit case Papa v. Katy
Industries, Inc.   The Seventh Circuit test involves three conditions, each in32
itself sufficient to establish that a subsidiary and a parent company are one
entity.  The conditions are: the parent company pierced the corporate veil; the
enterprise purposefully split itself in order to avoid the anti-discrimination
laws; or the parent company directed the subsidiary to perform the
discriminatory act.   The court in Papa adopted this test for both Title VII and33
the ADA.   There are two problems with this test.  First, adopting a strict-34
construction test by linking Title VII and the ADA together violates the intent
of the legislature that the ADA be more expansive than Title VII.  And
second, the test, if accepted, imposes a nearly impossible burden for an ADA
plaintiff to overcome.
The court in Papa adopted the test for both the ADA and Title VII as if
they were identical.  Yet, the strict interpretation adopted in Papa does not
coincide with the legislative history of the ADA.  In fact, Congress made
important distinctions between the two statutes, indicating that Congress
wished the ADA to be given a broader scope than Title VII.  First, the
legislature explicitly and extensively broadened the provisions of the ADA by
stating that the ADA would not incorporate the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison  that an employer35
need not accommodate an employee under Title VII if the accommodation
would require more than a de minimis cost for the employer.   Congress36
further stated that the reasonable accommodation must be provided unless it
rises to a level requiring “significant difficulty or expense” to the employer.37
Second, Title VII is not applicable to individuals elected to public office by
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89 (1985).
qualified voters.   When enacting the ADA, Congress expressly stated that38
the ADA did not incorporate Title VII’s elected-official exception.39
Since Congress highlighted certain changes in the ADA that had similar
or identical phrasing to provisions of Title VII, Congress did not intend the
ADA to be a mirror image of Title VII, with the words “race, religion, and
national origin” replaced with “disability.”  Further, where the legislature
intended to directly incorporate Title VII, it stated its intent.  For instance, the
legislature incorporated Title VII’s remedies into the ADA by cross-reference
to Title VII instead of copying and pasting the language into the ADA.   The40
intent in this instance was that the ADA’s remedies would be synchronized
with changes to the remedies of Title VII, not frozen by their direct
restatement in the ADA.   The legislative history in two instances suggests41
that the ADA was intended to be more expansive than Title VII.  Specifically,
the replacement of the de minimis employer burden with an undue-hardship
burden significantly expands the number of accommodations that would be
required to be implemented by employers.  The ADA’s minimum-threshold
provision should likewise not be construed against the implementation of
reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals.
Further, the test set forth in Papa heightens the burden placed upon an
ADA plaintiff.   First, the judicial inquiry that must be made in order to42
determine if the corporate veil has been pierced has been described as one of
the most confusing areas of law.   Placing a burden usually reserved for the43
attorneys of lucrative stockholder class actions onto attorneys seeking
equitable relief in the form of a reasonable accommodation is patently unfair.
Second, both of the other conditions, proving either the purposeful division of
a corporate entity to avoid anti-discrimination laws or a direct act by a parent
company to force the subsidiary to discriminate, approach the high burden of
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showing scienter or conscious behavior, as is required in securities-fraud
cases.   This burden, like the burden to establish a pierced corporate veil, is44
much too great to place upon a plaintiff pleading for a reasonable
accommodation.  At the present date, no plaintiff has successfully overcome
the burden established in Papa.
Yet regardless of which test is adopted, the amount of ink spilt in the
attempt to administer the bright-line rule of the minimum-employee threshold
illustrates its lack of effectiveness.  If the courts must formulate tests that
require the type of factual inquiry used in the pierced corporate-veil scenario,
judicial efficiency is not achieved.  Meanwhile, if the point of the ADA is to
promote a balance between disabled individuals and employers, small
businesses should be forced to litigate if they feel the accommodation
requested is an undue hardship.  ADA plaintiffs already must litigate concepts
as detailed as piercing the corporate veil.  Without some greater burden on
small businesses, the balance struck in the ADA fails.
III.  EMPLOYMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES:
WHAT THE ADA MISSES
The capitalist economy and the mindset of the United States requires that
each person earn his or her own way through life so that the government, and
ultimately the people, do not have to support that person.  The ADA was
enacted to allow persons with disabilities to have the same ability to earn their
way as non-disabled persons by giving them equal access to employment.45
The ADA’s minimum-employee threshold may seem very insignificant in the
entire scope of the ADA, but the significance of the barrier left by this
provision becomes visible when the labor and disability statistics of the United
States are studied.  The primary statistical data used here is from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States (Statistical Abstract).   The46
Statistical Abstract is the authoritative source of economic statistical
information in the United States.47
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Two preliminary matters must be explained about the Statistical Abstract.
First, the Statistical Abstract uses specific terms that must be defined.  Every
physical business location that employs a person  is termed an48
establishment.   An enterprise consists of all of the establishments or physical49
locations that are owned by a single entity.   The enterprises and50
establishments are placed in groups based on the number of persons they
employ.   Second, the statistics available do not have a group with enterprises51
of fewer than fifteen employees, but only a fewer-than-twenty employee
group.  The statistics are used to show trends and general truths about the state
of employment in the United States.  The intent of this section is to show the
gross inadequacy of the ADA in providing equal employment opportunity in
the United States with the inclusion of a minimum-employee threshold.  I do
not intend here to provide an exact snapshot of employment in the United
States.
In 1990, Congress stated that there were some forty-three million
Americans with disabilities.   In 2002, the number of disabled persons had52
climbed to over fifty-one million, or 18% of the total population, an increase
consistent with the population growth of the United States.   Of these 5153
million Americans, 28 million were between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five,
the age group that is considered the labor force of the United States.   Thus,54
the total work force of the U.S. was comprised of at least 13% disabled
persons.  The mean income of a person with a disability in 2002 was
$23,034.   Meanwhile, the mean income of a person without a disability was55
$31,840.   A further breakdown shows that 77% of individuals with a severe56
disability earned less than $20,000 per year, while only 39% of individuals
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without a disability earned less than $20,000 per year.   These figures lead to57
the grim fact that 26% of individuals with a severe disability were below the
poverty level compared to 8% of those without a disability.   Rural areas have58
had a higher frequency of disabled persons (17.6%) compared to urban areas
(15.8%) and suburbs (13.4%).59
In 1994, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
released a statement that Title I of the ADA is in full effect now that the
minimum-employee threshold for employer compliance has been reduced to
fifteen.   The release further explains that the expansion will increase the60
number of “covered entities” from 264,000 to 666,000 enterprises at 1.7
million establishments.   When taken at face value, these figures appear61
impressive and would lead one to believe that the minimum-employee
threshold is barely even a factor.  The EEOC omits, however, the percentage
of establishments that are within the ADA’s coverage.  The Statistical
Abstract reported that there were approximately 7.3 million establishments in
the U.S. in 2003.   Of these 7.3 million establishments, 2.1 million were part62
of an enterprise with more than twenty employees and would be covered by
the ADA.   Thus, the percentage of establishments that qualified as “covered63
entities” under the ADA based on being part of an enterprise with more than
twenty employees was a mere 28.7% of all establishments nationwide in
2003.   When the current court methodology of determining whether a64
subsidiary’s employee number is considered part of a parent corporation’s
employee number is factored into the figures, the situation becomes even more
bleak.   If a subsidiary, which may have its own establishment, is not65
considered part of a business with more than twenty employees, then the
establishment is considered alone and is not required to comply with the
ADA.  The number of establishments in the United States with more than
twenty employees was only 14.0% of the total establishments in the United
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States, or a total of 1.1 million of the total 7.3 million business
establishments.   If every establishment in the United States with fewer than66
twenty employees was either the only establishment of a business or was
considered by a court to be a stand-alone business (and the employees of the
parent corporation were not added to its employee number), then the number
of actual locations at which a disabled person would have a legal right to a
reasonable accommodation would be quite low.  I concede that not every
establishment with fewer than twenty employees will be separated from its
parent corporation in the determination of its employee number under the
ADA.  But still, the percentage of establishments required to comply with the
ADA is clearly below 25%, which is unsatisfactory.
The EEOC’s statement about the ADA’s coverage also assumes a
homogeneous dispersal of disabled persons and businesses across the United
States.  The percentage of disabled persons in the United States ranges, by
state, from 6.2% to 12.6%.   Regarding business, anyone who has traversed67
a mere one hundred miles from her home would know that homogeneity is not
reality in the United States.  In fact, the heterogeneous nature of America has
been touted as one of its best features.   Therefore, the protection afforded by68
the ADA would be much greater if the 666,000 businesses and 1.7 million
establishments that the EEOC claims are “covered entities” under the ADA
were evenly spread across the United States.  If this were the truth, the ADA
would provide a disabled person convenient access to a covered entity
anywhere.  The locations of “covered entities” have not been exactly
determined, but a rough comparison of certain recorded statistics illustrates
the heterogeneity present.  Greene County, Pennsylvania, a rural area, has a
recorded population of 40,000 people  with eleven major employment types.69 70
The total number of businesses and employees has been recorded for each
type.  If each entity in a business type employed an equal number of workers
as all of the other businesses in the type, only one out of eleven would employ
more than fifteen people.   In comparison, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,71
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an urban area, has a recorded population of 1.25 million people  with eleven72
major employment types.   Once again, if each entity in a business type73
employed an equal number of workers as the others of the same type, five out
of eleven would employ more than fifteen people.   This basic calculation74
shows only that it is more likely that a disabled person would encounter a
business that is a covered entity in an urban area than in a rural area.  When
this is coupled with the fact that more people with disabilities live in rural
areas than in cities or suburbs, the protection afforded by the ADA is once
again diminished.75
The EEOC further states that the decrease in the minimum-employee
threshold expands coverage to nearly 86% of the nation’s workforce.  This
figure is determined by considering the number of people who currently work
in a business or establishment with more than fifteen employees.  This figure,
according to the Statistical Abstract, is still true today.  But this figure proves
nothing about the effectiveness of the ADA.  The ADA was intended to be a
“clear and comprehensive mandate”  in order to provide “equality of76
opportunity”  for individuals with disabilities.  This lofty goal, which has77
been a point of laudation for the ADA,  is not achieved by providing78
somewhere for a person with a disability to work.  The fact that 86% of the
nation’s workforce is currently employed in a business that is considered a
“covered entity” does not fix the fact that a disabled person in the workforce
has to choose to work at one of the 2.1 million of 7.3 million business
establishments that may be required to comply with the ADA.   The lack of79
ADA protection for a disabled person in at least 5.2 million, or 71.3%, of all
business establishments is hardly equal opportunity.80
At most, the current state of the law provides a job somewhere.  Whether
the disabled individual enjoys her job, must engage in a long commute to
reach her job, or is settling for a job outside of her educational background are
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not concerns addressed by the current statute.  The assertion that a disabled
person has equal access to employment because 28.7% of business
establishments in the United States are currently required to comply with the
ADA is unreasonable.  The assertion runs afoul of common sense and human
experience.  This foul calls for the invalidation of any bright-line rule —in81
this case, the minimum-employee threshold.
IV.  TWO NEW PROPOSALS
Envision two common small businesses.  The first small business is a
“mom-and-pop” grocery store in a small town and has four employees with a
net profit of $25,000 per year for the owner and his wife, their only source of
income.  The second small business is a four-partner accounting and
investment firm in an urban area with a net profit of $950,000 per year to be
split among the four partners.  A paraplegic woman in a wheelchair applies to
work at both businesses.  In order to allow her to work at either business, a
ramp would need to be installed to allow her to enter the front of the building.
Also, the bathroom door would need to be widened so that she may access it.
The total renovations would cost approximately $2,000.
The purpose of the minimum-employee threshold was to protect small
businesses from the cost of litigation and from making accommodations that
were so costly that they jeopardize the financial stability of the business.  This
blanket rule may indeed protect some mom-and-pop businesses, but it is also
shielding lucrative and sophisticated businesses from compliance.  Judge
Posner has stated, with no reference to legislative history or empirical study,
that the “purpose [of the minimum-employee threshold] is unaffected by
whether the tiny firm is owned by a rich person or a poor one. . . .  If a firm is
too small to be able economically to cope with the anti-discrimination laws,
the owner will not keep it afloat merely because he is rich . . . .”   This82
assertion is inapposite to the legislative history of the ADA, which states that
the purpose of the threshold is to protect small businesses from the expense
of litigation and compliance.   If the small business has the financial83
resources to comply, its size is not of any importance.
So, according to the current version of the ADA and Judge Posner, both
of these businesses are exempt from compliance with the ADA, and thus this
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paraplegic woman would need to go elsewhere for employment.  Yet the
differences between these two businesses are clear and illustrate the folly of
using a minimum-employee threshold to protect economic interests.  The
minimum-employee threshold was designed to protect the first business, yet
the second business is allowed to hide behind this provision even though it can
easily finance an accommodation for this paraplegic woman.
I propose two revisions to the ADA that would protect a firm “too small
to be able to economically cope”  with the ADA but still further the purpose84
of the ADA.  In order to describe my proposals, I will refer to the above
hypothetical of the two small businesses.
A.  Removal of the Minimum-Employee Threshold
My first proposal involves removing the fifteen-employee minimum
threshold from the ADA’s definition of an employer because the undue
hardship provision contains adequate safeguards that would still allow the
courts to protect small businesses.  A problem with this proposal is that the
removal of the bright-line rule opens the door to increased litigation, which
many would claim would be a detriment.  But judicial efficiency and ease of
application do not warrant a bright-line rule that common sense finds
unreasonable,  as shown by the statistical evidence presented earlier.  A85
flexible test, while requiring more court interpretation, would allow the ADA
to be implemented and the employer to be protected when appropriate.  This
proposal may appear bold to those who are familiar with the ADA and Title
VII as they stand today.  But in fact, the disability legislations of individual
countries in the European Union do not contain minimum-employee threshold
provisions.86
Even with the current minimum-employee threshold, an employer with
fifteen employees may still challenge Title I of the ADA’s directive to
reasonably accommodate a disabled employee if the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the employer.   The hardship experienced by87
the employer must be more than de minimis, a marked difference between the
ADA and Title VII.   In fact, the statute states that the accommodation must88
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be of “significant difficulty or expense” to constitute an undue hardship to an
employer.   The statute lists four factors that a court should analyze: the89
nature and cost of the accommodation; overall financial resources and the
effect on expenses and financial resources of the facility or entity; the number
of persons employed at the facility or covered entity; and the type of
operations of the covered entity.   Consideration of these four factors of90
undue hardship would protect a true small business like the mom-and-pop
general store, just as the minimum-employee threshold had done before.
First, two of the four factors evaluate the major concern of the legislature:
financial resources and expense.   In the hypothetical, the difference in91
revenue between the general store and the accounting firm was the most
noticeable difference.  A court considering this accommodation should
determine that the accommodation might impose an undue hardship on the
mom-and-pop business because the accommodation would cost 8.0% of the
total profit of the business.  Meanwhile, a court might determine that the
accommodation is a mere de minimis hardship on the accounting and
investment firm because the accommodation would cost 0.2% of its total
profit.
Second, the undue-hardship provision actually considers the number of
employees that a business employs.  In the hypothetical, this factor would
have no relevance.  In this instance, the number of employees tells us nothing
about the ability of either business to make a reasonable accommodation for
a disabled individual.  But the provision is still available even though the
minimum-employee threshold is removed.  In some instances, an
accommodation of a massive scale would be an undue hardship even for an
employer with more than fifteen employees.  The application could be the
same in my proposal such that a four-person firm or a 200-person firm might
both warrant protection.
Finally, the undue-hardship provision considers the type of operations of
the covered entity, such as the structure and functions of its workforce.   This92
factor would operate under my proposal in the same fashion as it has under the
current version of the ADA.  The provision is currently designed to protect the
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employer who may meet the minimum-employee threshold and be financially
sound, but yet a reasonable accommodation would disrupt the workings of its
business.  For instance, a company may run various production lines that
require dropping something from a certain height to a lower height.  An
operator of a machine on both levels would be required to use a ladder.  If this
operator was injured in a car accident and required a cane to walk, the
business would not be required to install an elevator or ramp system to access
the different levels.  The installation of such equipment would require a
redistribution of equipment in the plant and would disrupt the production
lines.  Even if the cost is minimal, the accommodation is an undue burden on
the employer.
A test that has been advocated for the undue-hardship burden by
Professor Epstein could be readily applied to my proposal of removing the
minimum-employee threshold.   Professor Epstein’s test proposes a monetary93
range that a business would need to accommodate based upon a calculation of
its working capital.   For instance, a business with less than $20,000 in94
working capital would have an accommodation range of $100 to $1,000.   If95
the accommodation was outside of this range, the business would only be
required to pay up to $1,000.   This test would apply the more appropriate96
undue-hardship provision yet still provide flexibility and guidance for courts
and employers.
Under this proposal, a court would be able to analyze the actual
controversy at hand.  In the hypothetical, the court would be able to help the
paraplegic woman at the small accounting and investment firm because that
firm has the resources to provide the accommodation.  In the case of the small
grocery store, the court would be able to label the accommodation as an undue
hardship because of the level of expense in relation to the amount of revenue
the business generates.  This proposal allows more cases to be decided based
on the reasonableness of an accommodation rather than on a requirement that
is not linked to the underlying intent of the statute.  This standard also allows
for movement towards the comprehensive mandate to eliminate discrimination
against people with disabilities.  Meanwhile, we have avoided driving a small
business out of financial stability through compliance with the ADA.  Thus,
the balance discussed by President Bush would be tipped back toward even.
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B.  The Business Revenue Test
My second alternative proposal removes the minimum-employee
threshold but replaces it with another, more appropriate, bright-line test.  The
threshold would be a measure of economic or financial strength, and thus a
true test of the ability of a business to offer a reasonable accommodation.  The
minimum-employee threshold was designed to protect small businesses from
the expense of litigation and compliance.   But why did the drafters of Title97
VII and subsequently the ADA decide on the number fifteen?  The original
Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated that the minimum-employee threshold was
twenty-five.   The 1972 amendment to the original draft of the Civil Rights98
Act of 1964 changed the threshold to fifteen.   Before the 1972 amendment99
was adopted, the original draft of the amendment purported to decrease the
minimum threshold from twenty-five to eight.   During the debates of the100
Civil Rights Act of 1964, two judges expressed their disdain for such an
arbitrary number.  They stated that they believed the inclusion of the
minimum-employee threshold was a method by which to ensure that the Civil
Rights Act would apply only to a business that truly affected commerce.101
The judges referred to the determination of the minimum number as some
“quantum of income theory.”   Finally, they stated that the minimum-102
employee threshold was a “flimsy yardstick” to measure a business’s effect on
commerce such that it should be within the scope of the anti-discrimination
laws.   These statements and the many different proposed and adopted103
changes to the minimum-employee threshold show that it is not an exact or
appropriate method of determining whether an employer should be subject to
the anti-discrimination laws.
Another reason that the minimum-employee threshold is not a proper way
to decide which employers should be subject to anti-discrimination laws is
that some states have much lower minimum-employee thresholds in their state
anti-discrimination laws.   These states have adopted much lower-minimum104
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employee thresholds and yet have not destroyed the market for small
businesses due to disability discrimination litigation.   The range of105
minimum-employee threshold numbers illustrates the arbitrary nature of
having a minimum-employee threshold and supports the adoption of a new
test.  Also, an important point that indicates the continuing need for a federal
disability discrimination statute is that some states, such as Alabama and
Mississippi, have no state disability discrimination protection.
A better way to determine a business’s financial ability to provide a
reasonable accommodation would be to have a minimum threshold based on
an actual financial factor.  An easy test to apply would be to set a minimum
net-profit threshold.  For instance, if the business’s net revenue, based on its
income tax return, was below a certain amount, it would not be a “covered
entity” under the ADA.  In my hypothetical, both businesses would be
subjected to this test and would possibly need to comply.  If the minimum-
revenue threshold was, for instance, $40,000, the grocery store would not have
to comply while the accounting and investment firm would have to.  This test
would more appropriately administer the legislature’s intent that small
businesses be protected.  This test is very similar to the minimum-employee
threshold test, but it is a closer measure of the impact that an accommodation
would have upon a business.
CONCLUSION
The ADA has made considerable headway in removing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities, but the statute still contains more power.
Removing the minimum-employee threshold would unlock the true power of
the ADA and allow a true removal of the barrier that stops the complete
integration of people with disabilities into society.  The proposals of this paper
are geared toward the disabled individual, but yet they still respect the needs
of the employer.  Adopting one of these proposals would allow the courts to
protect small businesses when warranted but still effectuate the purpose of the
ADA when that protection is unwarranted.
